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Like many countries around the world, Ireland has enacted emergency legislation
to respond to the coronavirus pandemic. The scope of these powers are vast,
impacting on almost every aspect of life in Ireland. Notably, no state of emergency
has been declared in accordance with Ireland’s constitutional provisions or under
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Ireland’s Constitutional Emergency Provisions
Enacted in 1937, Ireland’s principal constitutional emergency provisions are outlined
in Article 28.3.3°; however, a state of emergency can only be declared by the
Oireachtas (Ireland’s bicameral legislature consisting of the Dáil—lower house—
and Seanad—upper house) ‘in time of war or armed rebellion’. The meaning of ‘time
of war or armed rebellion’ has been amended twice within the first 3 years of the
Constitution coming into effect and so a referendum was not required in accordance
with the Constitution’s transitory provisions. The first amendment allowed the state to
declare an emergency in response to the outbreak of World War II as it was felt that
the meaning of ‘war’ in Article 28.3.3° may not have included a so-called ‘neutrality
emergency’—a war in which the state was not a belligerent. This amendment,
although drafted in April 1939, was not introduced to the Oireachtas until the 2
September 1939 following Germany’s invasion of Poland the previous day. It passed
through the Oireachtas in a mere 3 hours and a state of emergency was declared.
The second amendment to Article 28.3.3º was enacted in 1941 to allow ‘time of war’
to include the period after the cessation of hostilities but when emergency powers
would still be required. This period would last until the Oireachtas resolved that an
emergency no longer existed. Ireland’s state of emergency to deal with World War II
would last until September 1976 where upon it was repealed and then immediately
replaced with a new emergency dealing with the conflict in Northern Ireland. This
would last until the IRA ceasefire February 1995. Consequently, Ireland has been in
a state of emergency for longer than it has been in a state of normalcy. 
Ireland’s constitutional emergency powers therefore focus entirely on political
violence. While courts have been reluctant to say whether the decision to declare
a state of emergency is even justiciable; nevertheless,  it would be difficult to
argue that a pandemic could fall under the meaning of ‘time of war or armed
rebellion.’ Consequently, Ireland’s response to the coronavirus pandemic must take
place entirely within the bounds of the Constitution and legislation that falls foul of
constitutional rights and separation of powers provisions may be struck down as
unconstitutional. Whether this is likely to occur, however, is another question.
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Measures Taken in Response to Coronavirus
In response to the coronavirus pandemic, Ireland enacted the Health (Preservation
and Protection and other Emergency Measures in the Public Interest) Act 2020
(hereinafter the Health Act 2020) and the Emergency Measures in the Public
Interest (Covid-19) Act 2020 (hereinafter the Emergency Act 2020). Contrary to
nomenclature, it is the Health Act 2020 that actually contains the most problematic
provisions from a human rights perspective.
The Health Act
The Health Act 2020 amends an existing piece of legislation—the Health Act
1947—which was introduced to provide ‘a complete code of the law relating to the
prevention of the spread of infectious disease’. The detention provisions in the 1947
Act were themselves designed to replace similar powers under the Emergency
Powers (No. 46) Order 1940. This latter regime was enacted under the Emergency
Powers Act 1939, which derived its validity from a declaration of emergency under
Article 28.3.3° of the Constitution in force as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
It was therefore not subject to constitutional constraints.
Part III of the Health Act 2020 confers on the Minister for Health powers to make
regulations ‘for preventing, limiting, minimising or slowing the spread of Covid-19’
as well as detailing a detention regime for potentially infected persons. Section 10
of the Health Act 2020 empowers the Minister for Health to pass regulations that
can include the power to restrict travel to or from the state, require persons to stay
in their homes and prohibit the holding of events. Section 10(i) further expands upon
these already broad powers to allow the minister to enact ‘any other measures the
Minister considers necessary in order to prevent, limit, minimise or slow the spread
of Covid-19.’
The scope of the powers conferred on the Minister are vast and concerning from a
human rights perspective. Article 40.6.1°ii for example, protects the right of citizens
‘to assemble peaceably and without arms’. Social distancing measures clearly
impact upon the right to publicly protest and to organise and hold meetings of
political organisations and trade unions. This right is fundamental in a democratic
society. However, like similar provisions in international treaties such as Article 11
ECHR, this right can be interfered with if meetings ‘are determined in accordance
with law to be calculated to cause a breach of the peace or to be a danger or
nuisance to the general public.’ Proportionality will be key and this will vary as the
pandemic progresses. The breadth of discretionary law-making authority conferred
on the Minister also raises concerns as to the separation of powers; specifically,
questions as to their compatibility with Article 15.2.1° which vests the sole and
exclusive law-making power for the state in the Oireachtas.
Section 11 introduces new powers of ‘detention and isolation of persons in certain
circumstances.’ A person can be detained under these provisions by a ‘medical
officer of health’ acting ‘in good faith’. A detained person must be examined as soon
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as possible ‘and in any event no later than 14 days from the time the person has
been detained. There is, however, no express time-limit on the duration which a
person can be detained for under these provisions. A detained person can request
that their detention be reviewed by a medical officer of health other than the officer
who made the initial order on the grounds that they are not a potential source of
infection.’ However, the appeal process to the Minister for Health under the 1947 Act
is not applicable to somebody detained under the Health Act 2020. Nevertheless, as
an Article 28.3.3° emergency is not in effect, the constitutional safeguards pertaining
to habeas corpus set out in Article 40.4 still apply.
Part III is due to sunset on 9 November 2020, unless a resolution is passed by both
Houses of the Oireachtas approving its continuation. There is no limit on how long
such an extension could last and Ireland has a poor track record of time-limited
legislation actually staying time-limited. The social welfare provisions in Part II of
the Health Act sunset much earlier on 9 May with no provision for renewal. The
reason for this is that Ireland is currently without a permanent Government following
February’s general election. Both pieces of legislation were enacted with cross-party
support under the auspices of a caretaker government. It was therefore felt that a
new permanent government would have to be in place by 9 May to enact further
social welfare provisions given the impact that the economic measures would have
on state finances and a programme of government. 
The Emergency Act
While the Health Act 2020 does contain some provisions pertaining to social welfare
payments, the Emergency Act 2020 contains the majority of the state’s economic
response to the crisis as well as relaxing regulations pertaining to employing health
professionals and armed forces personnel who have recently retired or left the
profession.
The most striking aspect of this legislation is Part II which prohibits rent increases
during the emergency period. Notably, the subject of rent freezes was a high-profile
issue during Ireland’s general election campaign at the start of 2020. Parties of
the left  argued that a rent freeze was necessary in response to what was termed
Ireland’s ‘housing emergency’. In contrast, centre-right parties opposed rent freezes
with Fianna Fáil arguing that rent freezes would be unconstitutional. This was based
on a tenuous reading of a case where a rent freeze on certain arbitrarily-selected
dwellings was found to be unconstitutional. Concern as to the constitutionality of a
rent freeze to deal with the pandemic, however, are conspicuously absent. 
The Impact of the Lack of a Declaration of a State of
Emergency
Although an Article 28.3.3° emergency is not in effect,  it is unlikely that courts will
find any of the new legislative provisions unconstitutional. Irish courts have been
willing to stretch the meaning of the Constitution to accommodate exceptional
powers in other situations without the need to declare a state of emergency. For
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example the  Supreme Court case rejected a challenge to the vast powers conferred
on the Minister for Finance by the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008
in response to the 2008 financial crisis on the grounds that these powers were ‘a
permissible constitutional response to an exceptional situation’. While the powers in
that case did not fall wholly within the Oireachtas’ ‘sole and exclusive’ law-making
authority owing to the fact that they pertained to financial matters; nevertheless,
the Supreme Court found the jurisprudence on the non-delegation doctrine to be
‘instructive and useful’ in upholding the constitutionality of the powers in question.
It is probable that this principle of an ‘exceptional situation’ affecting the breadth
of permissible powers that can be conferred on the executive will ensure the
constitutionality of the provisions of the Health Act 2020, notwithstanding the lack of
a de jure state of emergency.  
Rent freezing measures are also likely to be upheld due to their temporary and
proportionate nature and, ultimately, the flimsy constitutional basis upon which
objections to rent freezes were built in the first place. Such objections were more
symptomatic of a particular Irish phenomenon of the Constitution acting as a
convenient scapegoat for Irish politicians to explain why, in their opinion, certain
measures cannot be taken.
The problem with accommodating emergencies without an official declaration
is that emergencies are supposed to limit exceptional powers to exceptional
situations. When exceptional powers are introduced under the ordinary constitutional
framework, this quarantining effect of the de jure state of emergency is lost. The
measures are no longer limited to a clearly defined state of emergency. The power
then, as US Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson famously stated, ‘lies about
like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply
in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.’
A constitutional amendment would be required for Article 28.3.3º to be used to
confront a pandemic. While concerns should remain with regards to how de facto
emergencies affect constitutional constraints under normalcy, Article 28.3.3º is
considerably more troublesome. Currently, the only limitation on what the state may
do in an emergency is that it cannot reintroduce the death penalty. Everything else,
in principle, is on the table, including detention without trial, extending of the life-
time of the Dáil or vastly increasing the powers of the President. Indeed, it is unclear
whether the Constitution itself could be amended using Article 28.3.3º, in which
case,  the entire constitutional order could be transformed. Recent worrying trends in
Hungary should serve to underline why Ireland should take seriously the possibility
of constitutional usurpation through the guise of emergency powers.
If Ireland were to expand the definition of emergency in Article 28.3.3º, the powers
it enables would also need to be substantially curtailed. Here, Ireland could
look to Article 15 ECHR which requires that all emergency measures taken are
‘proportionate to the exigencies of the situation’—a requirement notably absent from
Article 28.3.3º. Furthermore, identifying certain constitutional provisions as non-
derogable could also be followed. As such a change would require a referendum,
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however, it is unlikely to happen any time soon and certainly not during the current
pandemic.
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